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~ IMPEACHMENT: EVIDENCE AMENDMENTS Paul C. Giannelli 
.J Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
~ J Several amendments to the Ohio Rules of Evidence, all 
) of which deal with methods of impeachment, became effec-
,. tive in 1998. 
; Although numerous factors, including demeanor, may be 
" considered in evaluaiing ihe credibility of wiinesses, 
) McCormick identifies "five main lines of attack upon the 
credibility of a witness:' 1 McCormick, Evidence § 33, at 111 
(4th ed. 1992). These include: (1) bias or interest, (2) prior 
inconsistent statements, (3) specific contradiction, (4) sen-
sory or mental defects, and (5) character for untruthfulness, 
which includes impeachment by reputation, opinion, prior 
convictions, and prior untruthful acts. The Ohio Rules of 
Evidence contain provisions on three of these methods of 
impeachment- e.g., untruthful character (Evid. R. 608 and 
609}, prior inconsistent statements (Evid. R. 613), and bias 
C IEvid. R. 616). The rule on bias was added in 1991. ·~ ,. Prior to the 1998 amendments, the Rules did not contain 
provisions on impeachment by (1) specific contradiction, (2) 
sensory or mental defects, (3) prior inconsistent conduct, or 
(4) learned treatise. See Kenney v. Fealko, 75 Ohio App.3d 
47, 51,598 N.E.2d 861 (1991)("The Ohio Rules of Evidence 
do not enumerate the various ways in which the credibility of 
a witness can properly be attacked .... Under [Evid.R. 
611 (B)] and the common-law rule, evidence of appellant's 
state of intoxication was admissible because it was relevant 
to the issue of her ability to perceive and hence her credibili-
ty:'). The amendments fill in these gaps in the law of im-
peachment. The amendments are as follows: 
• (1} Rule 607(8) codifies the good faith basis-in-fact re-
quirement for impeaching questions, 
• (2) Rule 613(8) codifies the common law rule on the ad-
missibility of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent 
statements, 
• (3) Rule 613(C) deals with impeachment by prior incon-
sistent conduct, 
• (4) Rule 616(8) deals with impeachment by sensory-
mental defects, 
• (5) Rule 616(C) deals with impeachment by specific 
contradiction, 
• (6) Rule 706 codifies the common law learned treatise 
impeachment rule, and 
• (7) Rule 806, which governs the impeachment of 
hearsay declarants, removes an inconsistency be-
tween that rule and Rule 609 (prior convictions). 
FEDERAL RULES 
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain provisions 
comparable to the 1998 amendments. Indeed, the Federal 
Rules do not have a rule on impeachment by showing bias. 
It took a United States Supreme Court opinion to resolve 
the issue. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 
(1984}("the lesson to be drawn ... is that it is permissible to 
impeach a witness by showing his bias under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence just as it was permissible to do so before 
their adoption:'). 
The federal drafters were aware that the Federal Rules 
as proposed did not have provisions on all the common law 
impeachment rules. The federal drafters included impeach-
ment rules only when they intended to limit impeachment. 
In their view, there was no need for an impeachment rule 
when no limitation on that type of impeachment applied. 
They assumed that such impeachment was admissible 
under Federal Rule 402, which makes relevant evidence ad-
missible. Professor Cleary, the Reporter for the Federal 
Rules, wrote that Federal Rule 1 02 indicates "one thing of 
importance: the answers to all questions that may arise 
under the Rules may not be found in specific terms in the 
Rules:· Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of 
Evidence, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 908, 908 (1978). Professor 
Cleary noted that the "common law experience will, then, 
suggest additional applications" such as "purportedly scien-
tific evidence in an insufficiently established field, contradic-
tio(l on collateral matters for impeachment purposes, and 
speculative and conjectural evidence:' ld. at 916. One feder-
al court stated it this way: "It is clear that in enacting the 
Federal Rules of Evidence Congress did not intend to wipe 
out the years of common law development in the field of evi-
dence, indeed the contrary is true. The new rules contain 
many gaps and omissions and in order to answer these un-
resolved questions courts certainly should rely on common 
law precedent:• Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 
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856 (4th Cir. 1980). 
The Ohio amendments are based on a different philoso-
phy- that all important evidence rules should be codified. 
Thus, the rationale for these amendments is straightforward: 
Since the amended rules currently apply in Ohio trials 
through the common law (see Evid. R. 1 02), they should be 
codified in order to make them readily accessible at trial. 
See 1 Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Evidence 
§ 102.4 (1996)(Rules of Evidence and common law). 
REASONABLE BASIS REQUIREMENT 
Amended Rule 607(8) requires that a questioner have a 
good faith basis for a question that implies the existence of 
an impeaching fact. 
Under the common law, a party inquiring into specific in-
stances of conduct must have a good faith basis in fact for 
asking the question. E.g., State v. Gillard, 40 Ohio St.3d 
226, 231, 533 N.E.2d 272 (1988) ("[A] cross-examiner may 
· ask a question if the examiner has a good-faith belief that a 
factual predicate for the question exists:'), cert. denied, 492 
U.S. 925 (1989); Kornreich v.lndus. Fire Ins. Co., 132 Ohio 
St. 78, 88, 5 N.E. 153 (1936) (''These collateral attacks must 
be made in good faith ... :'). This rule is especially impor-
tant in criminal cases where the unfair prejudice may be 
great. See also 1 McCormick, Evidence § 41, at 140 (4th 
ed.1992) ("A good faith basis for the inquiry is required:'). 
Professor Graham explains the requirement as follows: 
Note that the requirement of a good faith basis applies 
only when the cross examiner is effectively asserting 
in the form of a question the truth of a factual state-
ment included within the question. If the cross-exam-
iner is merely inquiring whether something is or is not 
true, a good faith basis is not required. Thus the ques-
tion, "Your glasses were being repaired at the time of 
the accident, weren't they?" requires a good faith 
basis, while the question, "Were you wearing your 
glasses at the time of the accident?" does not. 1 
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 607 .2, at 
679-80 (4th ed. 1996). 
In addition to the Rules of Evidence, the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility imposes requirements in this context. 
See D.R. 7-1 06(C) ("In appearing in his pro.fessional capaci-
ty before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: ... (1) State or allude 
to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is 
relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissi-
ble evidence:'). 
SENSORY OR MENTAL DEFECT 
Amended Rule 616(8) codifies the common law rule on 
impeachment by showing sensory or mental defect. Any 
sensory or mental deficiency that might affect a witness's 
capacity to observe, recall, and relate the events about 
which the witness has testified is admissible to impeach that 
witness's credibility. 
Pre-Rules Cases 
The pre-Rules cases permitted inquiry into a witness's 
capacity to observe and remember as well as other factors 
affecting perception and memory. See State v. Auerbach, 
108 Ohio St. 96, 98, 140 N.E. 507 (1923) ("means of obser-
vation"); Morgan v. State, 48 Ohio St. 371, 373-74, 27 N.E. 
710 (1891) (opportunity to observe, "intelligence"); Shelby v. 
Clagett, 46 Ohio St. 549, 552-53, 22 N.E. 407 (1889) (op-
portunities to observe, "intelligence, fairness"); Lee v. State, 
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21 Ohio St. 151, 154 (1871) (recollection); Stewart v. State, 
19 Ohio 302, 304 (1850) (proper to cross-examine witness 
on opportunity to observe and to remember); McAllister v. 
State, 13 Ohio Abs. 360, 362 (App. 1932) (mental condition 
affects credibility); State v. Webb, 72 Ohio Abs. 306, 308, . 
131 N.E.2d 273 (C.P. 1955) (mental condition affects credi- 4 
bility). 
In addition, evidence that the witness was under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the event or at the 
time of the trial fell within this category but generally notal-
coholism or drug addiction. E.g., Bell v. Rinner, 16 Ohio St. 
45, 48 (1864) (evidence that witness was "drunk, paralyzed, 
deaf"' proper; but extrinsic evidence of lack of ordinary intel-
ligence inadmissible); Johnson v. Knipp, 36 Ohio App.2d 
218, 221, 304 N.E.2d 914 (1 973) (intoxication of witness at 
time of event relevant to credibility); 1 McCormick, Evidence 
§ 44, at 162 (4th ed. 1 992) ("Habitual addiction stands differ-
ently. It is generally held that the mere fact of chronic alco-
holism is not provable on credibility:'); 3A Wigmore, 
Evidence§§ 931-35, 989-95 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
Post-Rule Cases 
Even though no provision addressed this issue until the 
1 998 amendment, the post-Rules cases are in accord with 
the pre-Rules cases. The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled 
that a witness's visual impairment is not a ground for incom-
petency under Rule 601, but rather a factor "relat[ing] to the 
credibility of the statements made by [the witness]:' Turner v. 
Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337,343,617 N.E.2d 1123 (1993). 
See also Kenney v. Fealko, 75 Ohio App.3d 47, 51, 598 
N.E.2d 861 (1 991) ("The Ohio Rules of Evidence do not 
enumerate the various ways in which the credibility of a wit-
ness can properly be attacked .... Under [Evid.R. 611 (B)] 
and the common-law rule, evidence of appellant's state of ~ 
intoxication was admissible because it was relevant to the 
issue of her ability to perceive and hence her credibility:'); 
State v. Troutman, 71 Ohio App.3d 755, 759, 595 N.E.2d 
414 (1 991) (per curiam) ("[T]he statements were admissible 
for the purpose of attacking the police officer's credibility 
through a showing of ... faulty memory:'). 
Extrinsic Evidence 
The common law cases did not indicate whether extrinsic 
evidence (i.e., the testimony of other witnesses) of sensory 
or mental defects may be introduced. There was probably 
no hard and fast rule. Sensory and mental defects often 
can be effectively disclosed through cross-examination, in 
which case the admissibility of extrinsic evidence could be 
regulated by the trial court pursuant to Rules 403 and 
611 (A). See 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 44, at 161 (4th 
ed.1 992) ("It seems eminently a case for discretion. The 
trial judge would determine whether the crucial character of 
the testimony attacked and the evaluative light shed by the 
impeaching evidence overbalance the time and distraction 
involved in opening this side-dispute:'). 
The amended rule provides for the admissibility of this 
type of evidence on cross examination or through extrinsic 
evidence. Moreover, the amended rule does not affect Rule 
601, which governs the competency of witnesses, or Rule 
602, which specifies the firsthand knowledge requirement. 
SPECIFIC CONTRADICTION 
Rule 616(C) codifies the common law rule on impeach-
ment by specific contradiction. There are two distinct meth-
ods of impeachment by contradiction. First, self-contradic-
tion involves the use of a witness's own prior inconsistent 
stat~ments or conduct to contradict the witness's present 
test1mony. Rule 613 governs this type of impeachment 
Second, contradiction may involve the testimony of one wit-
ness that conflicts with the testimony of another witness 
(called "specific contradiction"). For example, witness A 
\ may testify that he saw the defendant shoot the victim but 
· witness B, who was also present, may testify that she 'saw a 
different person shoot the victim. In this example, witness 
B's testimony, as an eyewitness, would be admissible even 
in the absence of the incidental impeachment effect on the 
testimony of witness A. The problem arises when the only 
purpose of witness B's testimony is to contradict A's testi-
mony, especially if the contradiction is on a minor point 
This situation gave rise to the so-called "collateral matters" 
rule. E.g., Byomin v. Alvis, 169 Ohio St. 395, 396, 159 
N.E.2d 897 (1959) (per curiam) ("It is elementary that a wit-
ness may not be impeached by evidence that merely con-
tradicts his testimony on a matter that is collateral:'); State v. 
Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 135,84 N.E.2d 742 (1949) 
("The cross-examiner is not permitted to introduce rebuttal 
evidence to contradict the witness on collateral matters:'). 
"Collateral Matters" Rule 
The circumstances under which a party may introduce 
extrinsic evidence of contradiction is typically stated in terms 
of the so-called "collateral matters" rule. The term "collateral 
matters" may be misleading. The common law rule did not 
prohibit a party from cross-examining on a "collateral mat-
ter:' It prohibited only the introduction of extrinsic evidence 
on the issue. The underlying policy was to "avoid[] the dan-
gers of surprise, jury confusion and wasted time:' State v. 
Kehn, 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 17,361 N.E.2d 1330 (1977) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 858 (1977). The impeach-
) , ment theory here is that the witness made one mistake and 
therefore may have made others. This line of attack has lim-
ited probative value for impeachment (a person who makes 
a mistake on one unimportant issue may also make a mis-
take on an important issue) and the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence would consume time. 
Admissible on the Merits 
Attempting to codify the common law decisions, amend-
ed Rule 616(C) recognizes three instances when extrinsic 
evidence on contradiction is admissible. According to 
Wigmore, extrinsic evidence of contradiction should be ad-
mitted if the evidence would be admissible "for any purpose 
independently of the contradiction:' 3A Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 1003, at 961 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Explaining this test, 
McCormick wrote that two types of facts were independently 
provable: ''The first kind are facts that are relevant to the 
substantive issues in the case:' McCormick, Evidence§ 47, 
at 110-11 (3d ed. 1984). Rule 616 (C)(1) addresses this 
issue. An illustration would be eyewitness B in the above 
example; as an eyewitness, B's testimony was admissible 
on the merits (or substantively) and thus there is basis for 
admission, in Wigmore's words, that is independent of the 
contradiction. 
Other Methods of Impeachment 
The second category, according to McCormick, are 
"facts showing bias, interest, conviction of crime, and want 
of capacity or opportunity for knowledge:' ld. In other words, 
the second category encompasses those methods of im-
peachment, such as bias, that always permit the introduc-
tion of extrinsic evidence. The Ohio Supreme Court ap-
peared to have adopted Wigmore's approach in an early 
case. See Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426, 431 (1884) (Ex-
3 
trinsic evidence is admissible when "the matter offered in 
contradiction is in any way relevant to the issue, or such as 
tends to show prejudice or interest:'). Rule 616(C)(2) enu-
mer~tes the rules that fall within this category -for exam-
ple, Impeachment by showing bias under Rule 616(A). 
Common Law 
McCormick argued that extrinsic evidence of contradic-
tion should also be admitted in a third situation, one in 
which such evidence is critical to determining the credibility 
of a witness's story. He refers to this as "linchpin" evidence: 
"So we may recognize this third type of allowable contradic-
tion, namely, the contradiction of any part of the witness's 
account of the background and circumstances of a material 
transaction, which as a matter of human experience he 
would not have been mistaken about if his story was true:' 
McCormick, Evidence§ 47, at 112 (3d ed. 1984). 
McCormick provides several examples: Stephens v. 
Peopl~, 19 N.Y. 549, 572 (1859) (murder by poisoning with 
arsemc; defendant's witnesses testified the arsenic was ad-
ministered to rats in cellar where provisions kept; held prop-
er for state to prove by another witness that no provisions 
were kept in cellar); Hartsfield v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 451 
P.2d 576 (Alaska 1969) (on issue whether insurance cancel-
lation notice was sent to defendant by insurer; defendant 
denied receipt and also receipt of notices of cancellations of 
the insurance from two other sources. Evidence of the mail-
ing by the two latter sources was held not collateral). By re-
ferring to the common law, Rule 616(C)(3) encompasses 
this category. Admittedly, this is a vague category. 
For example, assume that a defendant claims alibi for a 
bank robbery that was committed on May 1 in Cleveland. 
An alibi witness testifies that the defendant was with her in 
Chicago on May 1. The alibi witness further testifies that 
she remembers the day because it was a sunny day and 
they walked by the lake. May a prosecutor impeach by in-
troducing the testimony of a weather forecaster, which re-
veals that it snowed in Chicago on May 1? Such testimony 
is not "independently provable:' This evidence, however, is 
important and is therefore admissible under this category. 
Extrinsic Evidence Defined 
In the impeachment context, extrinsic evidence means 
evidence introduced through the testimony of other witness-
es. See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 36, at 118 (4th ed.1992) 
("Extrinsic evidence, that is, the production of attacking wit-
nesses ... is sharply narrowed for obvious reasons of econ-
omy of time and attention:'). Accordingly, documentary evi-
dence offered through the witness being impeached is not 
extrinsic evidence because it typically does not consumed 
mu<fh additional time. 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
Rule 613(8) was changed to specify when extrinsic evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent statement is admissible. As 
adopted in 1980, Rule 613 did not fully specify the circum-
stances under which extrinsic evidence is admissible in this 
context; it merely conditioned the admission of extrinsic evi-
dence on the laying of a foundation on cross-examination. 
Pre-Rules Cases 
Even if a proper foundation had been laid on cross-exam-
ination, extrinsic evidence of a prior statement was admissi--
ble only if it did not relate to a "collateral matter:' Byomin v. 
Alvis, 169 Ohio St. 395, 159 N.E.2d 897 (1959); Kent v. 
State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884). The collateral matter rule ap-
plied only to extrinsic evidence; it did not preclude inquiry on 
cross-examination so long as the examination was relevant 
to impeachment. 
The cases, however, were not altogether consistent. If 
the witness admitted making the prior statement, it was not 
error for the trial court to refuse to admit the statement in 
evidence. See Blackford v. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St. 268, 270, 
20 N.E.2d 522 (1939); Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio St. 177, 165 
N.E. 721 (1929); Dietsch v. Mayberry, 70 Ohio App. 527, 47 
N.E.2d 404 (1942). A court's decision to admit the state-
ment, however, was also probably not error. See Bluestein 
v. Thompson, 102 Ohio App. 157, 139 N.E.2d 668 (1957). 
Although one appellate court held that, "after a proper foun-
dation for impeachment has been laid for the introduction of 
inconsistent statements of a witness, it becomes necessary 
to prove them," Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App.2d 297, 
305, 253 N.E.2d 804 (1969), this was not a hard and fast 
rule. 
Post-Rules Cases 
The exact definition of what constituted a collateral mat-
ter in Ohio, as elsewhere, was unclear. Some courts indi-
cated that the issue should be decided by the trial court 
under Rule 403. E.g., State v. Shaffer, 114 Ohio App.3d 97, 
102, 682 N.E.2d 1040 (1996) (''The decision whether to 
admit a prior inconsistent statement which is collateral to 
the issue being tried and pertinent to the credibility of a wit-
ness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
judge."); State v. Riggins, 35 Ohio App.3d 1, 3, 519 N.E.2d 
397 (1986) (admissibility of evidence on collateral matters is 
a matter within the discretion of the trial court); Schwartz v. 
Wells, 5 Ohio App.3d 1, 3, 449 N.E.2d 9 (1982); 1 
McCormick, Evidence§ 36, at 118 (4th ed.1992) (The 
"statements must have as their subject facts relevant to the 
issues in the cause."'); 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1020 
(Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
See also State v. Jacobs, 1 08 Ohio App.3d 328, 333, 670 
N.E.2d 1 014 (1995) (because the witness admitted making 
the prior inconsistent statement at a preliminary hearing, 
"whether the transcript itself was admitted into evidence 
made little difference since the substance of the prior incon-
sistent statement was already before the jury"); State v. 
Minor, 47 Ohio App.3d 22, 27, 546 N.E.2d 1343 (1988) 
(''There is no requirement that extrinsic evidence be intro-
duced to establish a prior inconsistent statement if such 
statement is denied, unless there is an indication that the 
impeaching question may have been posed without a good 
faith belief that such an inconsistent statement had been 
made:'). 
Amended Rule 
Rule 613(B) was changed to specify when extrinsic evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent statement is admissible. 
These circumstances closely track those of impeachment 
by evidence of specific contradiction as provided in Rule 
616(C). See Staff Note, Evid. R. 616(C) (1998). Under the 
amended rule, extrinsic evidence is admissible if the prior 
statement relates to the material issues in the case, is oth-
erwise admissible under some other impeachment rule 
(e.g., Evid. R. 616(A)(bias)), or is admissible under the com-
mon law. 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT CONDUCT 
As adopted in 1980, Ohio Rule 613 did not provide for 
impeachment by evidence of prior inconsistent conduct. Nor 
did the federal rule. See Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. 
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Evid. R. 613 ("Under principles of exp~ession uniu_s t~e rule 
does not apply to impeachment by ev1dence of pnor Incon-
sistent conduct:'). Because no rule prohibited such im-
peachment, this type of evidence was admissible under 
Evidence Rule 102 (construction and purpose provision) if 
relevant. 
In a pre-Rules case, the Ohio Supreme Court had writ-
ten: "Conduct inconsistent with the testimony of a witness, 
may be shown as well as former statements thus inconsis-
tent:' Dilcher v. State, 39 Ohio St. 130, 136 (1883). Accord 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Dolly Madison Leasing & 
Furniture Corp., 42 Ohio St.2d 122, 132, 326 N.E.2d 651 
(1975)("inconsistency in behavior'' admissible for impeach-
ment); 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 34, at 113 n. 5 (4th ed. 
1992) ("Conduct ... evincing a belief inconsistent with the 
facts asserted on the stand is usable on the same principle" 
as a prior inconsistent statement.). 
Foundation 
In Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Supreme Court im-
posed the same foundational requirements for impeach-
ment by prior inconsistent conduct as were required for im-
peachment by prior inconsistent statements: "an adequate 
foundation for admission of the film was laid during cross-
examination ... and the witness was allowed to explain the 
apparent inconsistency upon redirect:' 42 Ohio St.2d at 
132. The rule adopts a comparable requirement. 
Substantive Use 
The amendment applies to the impeachment of a wit-
ness, including a party who testifies. It does not, however, 
apply to a party's inconsistent conduct that may be intro-
duced on the merits; admissions by the conduct of a party 
(sometimes known as "implied admissions") may be admis- I 
sible substantively and are not restricted by Rule 613(C). 
See Staff Note(1998) (citing 1 Giannelli & Snyder, Bald-
win's Ohio Practice Evidence § 401.8-.10 (1996) (adverse 
inferences: spoliation, admissions by conduct, failure to pro-
duce evidence or call witnesses)). 
LEARNED TREATISES 
The common law rule restricted the use of a learned 
treatise to the impeachment of an expert. Accordingly, the 
substantive use of such a treatise violated the hearsay rule. 
Hearsay: Federal Rule 
When the Ohio Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1980, 
Ohio rejected Federal Evidence Rule 803(18), which recog-
nizes a hearsay exception for learned treatises. In contrast 
to the federal rule, the Ohio cases have limited the use of 
learned treatises to impeachment; the treatise is considered 
hearsay and may not be used as substantive evidence. This 
limitation applied at common law. For example, in Hallworth 
v. Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E.2d 690 
(1950) (syllabus, para. 2), the Ohio Supreme Court held: 
"Medical books or treatises, even though properly identified 
and authenticated and shown to be recognized as standard 
authorities on the subject to which they relate, are not ad-
missible in evidence to prove the truth of the statements 
therein contained:' According to the Court, the "bases for 
exclusion are lack of certainty as to the validity of the opin-
ions and conclusions set forth, the technical character of the 
language employed which is not understandable to the aver-
age person, the absence of an oath to substantiate the as-
sertions made, the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the 
author, and the hearsay aspect of such matter:' Piotrowski v. 
Corey Hospital, 172 Ohio St. 61, 69, 173 N.E.2d 355 (1961 ). 
See also Lambert v. Dally, 30 Ohio App.2d 36, 281 N.E.2d 
857 (1972); Bluebird Baking Co. v. McCarthy, 19 Ohio Abs. 
466,470, 36 N.E.2d 801 (App. 1935). 
After the Ohio Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1980, 
1 
-(\ the common law rule continued under Evidence Rule 1 02. 
In 1992 the Ohio Supreme Court commented in Ramage v. 
Cent. Ohio Emergency Serv. Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 87, 11 0, 
592 N.E.2d 828 (1992)(citing Giannelli, Ohio Evidence): 
Unlike the evidentiary rules of the federal courts, the 
Ohio Rules of Evidence do not provide for the learned 
treatise exception to the hearsay rule. In Ohio, text-
books and other learned treatises are considered 
hearsay, may not be used as substantive evidence, 
and are specially limited to impeachment purposes 
only. 
See also Kane v. Ford Motor Co., 17 Ohio App.3d 111, 112, 
477 N.E.2d 662 (1984)("0hio has not adopted the learned 
treatise exception to the hearsay rule, as have the federal 
courts (Fed.R.Evid. 803[18]):'); Beavercreek Local Schools 
v. Basic, Inc., 71 Ohio App.3d 669, 676, 595 N.E.2d 360 
(1991 )("The Ohio Rules of Evidence do not incorporate the 
learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule incorporated 
in Fed.Evid.R. 803(18)."); Steinfurth v. Armstrong World 
Industries, 27 Ohio Misc.2d 21, 23, 500 N.E.2d 409 (C.P. 
1986)("The Ohio Rules of Evidence omit the learned trea-
tise rule which is contained in Fed.Evid.R. 803(18):'). 
Scope of the Rule 
Jurisdictions that have limited the use of learned treatises 
to impeachment have differed as to when impeachment is 
proper: 
' ~ ~ The most restrictive position is that the witness must 
have stated expressly on direct his reliance upon the 
treatise. A slightly more liberal approach still insists 
upon reliance but allows it to be developed on cross-
examination. Further relaxation dispenses with re-
liance but requires recognition as an authority by the 
witness, developable on cross-examination. The 
greatest liberality is found in decisions allowing use of 
the treatise on cross-examination when its status as 
an authority is established by any means. Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 803. 
The key issue in Ohio was whether treatises "recognized 
as authoritative;· in addition to those "relied upon;' by an ex-
pert could be used for impeachment. At one time the Ohio 
position was somewhat difficult to characterize. The syllabus 
in Hallworth v. Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 356, 
91 N.E.2d 690 (1950), referred to treatises "recognized as 
standard authorities" without mentioning reliance by the ex-
pert. The language of the opinion, however, was more re-
strictive: 
[l]t is difficult to understand how inquiries with respect 
to statements in a particular book would be proper if it 
had not first been brought out that Dr. Kramer based 
his conclusions in some way on statements in that 
book. If Dr. Kramer denied that he had known about 
this particular book, it is difficult to see how his further 
cross-examination with regard to the book would be 
t ' proper at all. 
In a later case, however, the Court wrote: "[l]n Ohio, a 
learned treatise may be used for impeachment purposes to 
demonstrate that an expert witness is either unaware of the 
text or unfamiliar with its contents. Moreover, the substance 
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of the treatise may be employed only to impeach the credi-
bility of an expert who has relied upon the treatise, ... , or 
has acknowledged its authoritative nature." Stinson v. 
England, 69 Ohio St.3d 451, 458, 633 N.E.2d 532 (1994). 
The rule permits impeachment in both circumstances, as 
well as through judicial notice. A possible expansion of the 
common law rule concerns the use of judicial notice to es-
tablish the treatise as a reliable authority. A court taking ju-
dicial notice of Grey's Anatomy illustrates this aspect of the 
rule. 
The trial court decides under Rule 1 04(A) if the treatise is 
a "reliable authority;• and Rule 1 05 requires a limiting in-
struction upon request. If an opposing expert witness refus-
es to recognize a treatise as reliable, the judge may permit 
the impeachment, subject to counsel's subsequent laying of 
the foundation through its own expert. There is no need to 
inform the jury of the trial court's determination. 
Learned Treatise Defined 
In O'Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d 159, 164, 407 N.E.2d 
490 (1980), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that an editorial 
in the Journal of the American Medical Association was not 
a learned treatise because it had been prepared with a view 
toward litigation. An author writing for her profession has a 
strong incentive for accuracy because the author seeks ac-
ceptance by the profession. In contrast, where "the author 
publishes an article with a view toward litigation, or where 
he possesses a personal interest in a litigable matter, a 
probability of bias exists which undermines the logic sup-
porting the admission of this material in evidence as an ex-
ception to the rule against hearsay:' This case, however, 
was decided before the adoption of the Rules of Evidence in 
1980, and it differs from the Rules because the quoted lan-
guage appears to recognize a hearsay exception. Only in 
the hearsay context is the reliability of the treatise important. 
For impeachment, the critical point is that a text that the ex-
pert either relied upon or recognizes as authoritative is in-
consistent with that expert's testimony. 
Nevertheless, the issue was raised again in a later case. 
Worthington City Schools v. ABCO Insulation, 84 Ohio 
App.3d 144, 616 N.E.2d 550 (1992), involved the use of a 
learned treatise that the plaintiff claimed had been written 
for asbestos litigation. The court acknowledged that the un-
derlying research may have been prepared in anticipation of 
litigation, but the article itself was not. The article did not 
mention litigation, and the testifying expert was one of 16 
co-authors. Moreover, the article had been submitted for 
peer review and revised before it was published in a scientif-
ic journal. 
IMPEACHMENT OF HEARSAY DECLARANTS 
Ohio Rule 806 governs the admissibility of evidence re-
lating to the credibility of hearsay declarants and persons 
who make representative admissions, which include autho-
rized admissions, servant and agent admissions, and con-
spirator admissions under Rule 801 (D)(2). As the federal 
drafters explained, ''The declarant of a hearsay statement 
which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness. His 
credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and 
support as though he had in fact testified."' Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 806. Accordingly, these de-
clarants may be impeached by showing bias, untruthful 
character, evidence of prior convictions, inconsistent state-
ments, and so forth. See 2 Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's 
Ohio Practice Evidence§ 806.1 (1996). 
1998 Amendment 
In 1998 Rule 806 was restructured, and the following 
statement was added: "Evidence of a declarant's prior con-
viction is not subject to any requirement that the declarant 
be shown a public record." The limitation in Rule 609(F} that 
a prior conviction offered for impeachment be proved by the 
testimony of the witness or by public record shown to the 
witness during the examination clearly contemplates the wit-
ness's presence at trial; this is in tension with Rule 806, 
which provides that a hearsay declarant may be impeached 
"by any evidence which would have been admissible for 
those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness:· 
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In State v. Hatcher, 108 Ohio App.3d 628, 671 N.E.2d 
572 (1996}, a witness for the defense at the defendant's first 
trial was unavailable at the time of a second trial. His testi-
mony from the first trial was admitted into evidence as for-
mer testimony under Rule 804(8) (1 ). The trial court then 
admitted into evidence certified copies of the declarant's 
prior felony convictions, which were offered by the prosecu-
tion to impeach the witness (now declarant). The court of 
appeals noted the "arguable conflicf' between Rule 609(F) 
and Rule 806, but determined that the admission of the cer-
tified copies of the witness's prior felony convictions was not 
error. The amendment clarifies this ambiguity. 
